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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The Naugatuck Valley in western Connecticut was once the center of the American brass 
industry and one of the most intensely industrialized areas on earth. From its center in Waterbury, the 
region's major city, with a population of 100,000, the Valley runs north through the towns of Thomaston 
and Torrington and south through Naugatuck, Seymour, Derby and Ansonia. Like so many industrial areas 
of the Northeast and Midwest, its workers are primarily the descendants of immigrants from Eastern and 
Southern Europe, with more recent additions of Blacks from the South and Puerto Ricans. During the 
1960s and '70s it could have been renamed "deindustrial valley," as dozens of plants were sold or closed. 
Like those in similar areas elsewhere, the people of the Naugatuck Valley have found that their 
established approaches have given them little leverage over deindustrialization. Conventional union 
tactics have exerted little influence over companies prepared to close up or sell the shop. Legislation to 
affect plant closings has been difficult to pass, and when passed has had limited impact. Local 
communities have felt powerless in the face of decisions made in distant board rooms; until recently, few 
efforts have been made to affect those decisions, even when they threatened the lifeblood of Naugatuck 
Valley communities. 
Over the past three years, the Valley has developed a regional organization of more than 50 religious, 
labor, community and small business organizations. Called the Naugatuck Valley Project, its purpose is to 
give workers and communities more influence over their economic destiny. 
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People Are 
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The Naugatuck Valley Project 
• Jeremy Brecher 
The Naugatuck Valley in western Connecticut was once the center 
of the American brass industry and one of the most intensely 
industrialized areas on earth. From its center in Waterbury, the 
region's major city, with a population of 100,000, the Valley runs 
north through the towns of Thomaston and Torrington and south 
through Naugatuck, Seymour, Derby and Ansonia. Like so many 
industrial areas of the Northeast and Midwest, its workers are 
primarily the descendants of immigrants from Eastern and 
Southern Europe, with more recent additions of Blacks from the 
South and Puerto Ricans. During the 1960s and '70s it could have 
been renamed "deindustrial valley," as dozens of plants were sold 
or closed. 
Like those in similar areas elsewhere, the people of the Naugatuck 
Valley have found that their established approaches have given 
them little leverage over deindustrialization. Conventional union 
tactics have exerted little influence over companies prepared to 
close up or sell the shop. Legislation to affect plant closings has 
been difficult to pass, and when passed has had limited impact. 
Local communities have felt powerless in the face of decisions 
made in distant board rooms; until recently, few efforts have been 
made to affect those decisions, even when they threatened the 
lifeblood of Naugatuck Valley communities. 
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Over the past three years, the Valley has developed a regional 
organization of more than 50 religious, labor, community and 
small business organizations. Called the Naugatuck Valley Project, 
its purpose is to give workers and communities more influence 
over their economic destiny. 
The Project's strategy grows out of its analysis of what has 
happened to the Valley's economy. While most Valley companies 
were once locally-owned, today they are mostly controlled by 
multinational conglomerates for whom local plants are mere 
specks on a balance sheet. Project leaders trace much of the 
Valley's economic distress to corporations which, instead of 
nurturing local companies, run them for a quick profit and then 
"disinvest" by closing them, scaling them down, or selling them 
off to owners who eliminate jobs. 
Project leaders often characterize the NVP's preferred solution 
to this problem as "broad-based local ownership." As NVP 
president Rev. Tim Benson put it, "When somebody in London 
or Los Angeles owns a mill in the Valley, you feel helpless and 
out of control. When you are in charge of your life by being a 
member of a democratically-owned company, you're going to feel 
less anxiety than you would if somebody in Los Angeles is pulling 
the strings." 
The Project draws on the experience and tactics of community 
organizing, but attempts to project those approaches into the 
economic sphere. It tries to mobilize concern about deindustrial-
ization in unions, churches and other organizations that see the 
people of the Valley as their constituency. And it tries to serve 
as a vehicle through which those groups can bargain with 
corporations, government, and other powerful institutions over 
the economic fate of the Valley. While its strongest emphasis so 
far has been on employee buyouts, it has also explored such other 
approaches as eminent domain, starting new enterprises, and 
requiring that urban development be linked to job preservation. 
With chapters in six towns, hundreds of active supporters, and 
meetings almost daily in one or another part of the Valley, the 
Project has become a vital force in the life of the region. This is 
a report on its experience so far. 
• Jeremy Brecher is a labor historian, author of the modern classic, Strike! With 
Jerry Lombardi and Jan Stackhouse, he compiled and edited the oral history, 
Brass Valley: The Story of Working People's Lives and Struggles in an American 
Industrial Region. This article was prepared with the help of many people in-
volved with the Naugatuck Valley Project and with the Seymour Specialty Wire 
Co. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of all those who gave time 
to be interviewed or to comment on the manuscript. 
—Theresa Francis, chairp< 
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 If all the people in the city are banded 
together to make it a better place to live, 
then it will be a better place to live. That's 
what Naugatuck Valley Project is all about." 
—Theresa Francis, chairperson of UAW Local 1604's Century Brass 
Steering Committee. 
Origins of the Project 
The Naugatuck Valley Project grew out of meetings of statewide 
leaders of Catholic and Protestant denominations; the United 
Autoworkers; the Connecticut Citizens Action Group; and Ken 
Galdston, an organizer experienced with similar coalition efforts 
in Chicago, Buffalo and elsewhere. Deeply concerned about the 
economic distress of their constituents in the Valley, these groups 
decided to initiate an alliance that could assert worker and 
community interests in response to threats of plant closings. 
With financial and in-kind support from these statewide institu-
tions, Galdston began early in 1983 to call on community leaders 
in the Valley. He focused particularly on informing local trade 
unionists of the early warning signs of impending plant closings 
or sales. Almost immediately a local union leader identified such 
signs at General Time Controls (GTC), a 140-employee subsidiary 
of Talley Industries in Thomaston. The Project alerted Thomaston 
union and church people, who met together and asked for a 
meeting with the president of GTC. After a story in the local paper 
and a call from a local minister, the GTC president agreed to meet 
with the NVP. 
Having received this first degree of recognition in the form of 
the company's agreement to meet with them, the coalition had 
to decide what it wanted to negotiate for. Talley had announced 
that the plant was for sale. The workers at GTC, mostly over 50, 
discussed, but did not support, a worker buyout. So the coalition 
decided to ask Talley to give preference to buyers who would keep 
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the jobs in the Valley. Talley said yes, and in fact ended up selling 
two of its product lines to a company which moved the jobs to 
a nearby location. 
Several lessons from this early experience have guided much 
of the subsequent work of the Project. First, it established that 
a local coalition of diverse groups can be pulled together around 
the threat of a plant closing or sale if preliminary preparations 
have taken place and participants have some sense of what to do. 
Second, even a large absentee owner can be forced to recognize 
and bargain with a community coalition if enough pressure is 
brought to bear. Third, the union, as the representative of the 
majority of the employees, must be involved from the start. Finally, 
a certain degree of creativity is necessary to define a program 
which meets the needs of the community in a realistic way. All 
in all, the experience showed that the community and workers 
united were no longer powerless to influence corporate decisions. 
A similar course was followed when a union leader at the Torin 
Company, which had recently been bought by the conglomerate 
Clevepak, reported warning signs at the company plant in Torrington. 
Local management denied anything was in the wind; corporate 
management refused to meet with the union. The Project there-
upon went to the press with its analysis of the threat; Waterbury's 
Auxiliary Bishop Peter Rosazza called corporate headquarters to 
ask for a meeting. Workers in the plant, who were interested in 
exploring a buyout, did a homemade feasibility study. The mayor 
and the Torrington Chamber of Commerce joined the coalition. 
Enough pressure having thus been generated, the president of 
Clevepak finally agreed to meet with the coalition. He conceded 
that Clevepa"k had been considering selling Torin, but said they 
had now decided not to sell it. And he agreed to come to the 
employees first if Torin was to be sold in the future. 
Next, Emhart, another conglomerate, closed the casting shop 
at its subsidiary in Ansonia, apparently signaling the liquidation 
of the company. Emhart, too, refused to meet with the union to 
discuss the closing. A community meeting with union officials, 
clergy, the head of the Chamber of Commerce, and both 
candidates for mayor decided to ask for a meeting with Emhart. 
Over the weekend, the Project gathered 1,500 signatures on a 
petition to Emhart, primarily through two local parishes and the 
Steelworkers local. Thereupon Emhart agreed to meet. It promised 
to give the Project notice if it decided to sell any parts of the 
company. Whether or not in response to Project pressure, the one 
building it has sold went to a company which has increased the 
jobs there. 
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Seymour Specialty Wire 
Early in 1984, workers at the Bridgeport Brass wire mill in 
Seymour, a subsidiary of National Distillers, heard rumors that 
their plant might be sold. A UAW staff rep immediately steered 
the local leadership to the Project and urged them to look into 
buying the plant. The Project presented various options to the 
local, including employee ownership. Workers responded with a 
spirit of skepticism, but also with a sense that they wanted to 
pursue every angle that might help save the company's 250 jobs. 
The local voted to pursue the possibility of a buyout. To prepare 
a feasibility study, the Project pulled together a team which 
included prestigious Connecticut law and accounting firms and 
the Industrial Cooperative Association (ICA), a consulting organ-
ization specializing in worker-owned companies. A Seymour 
chapter of the Project was formed to support the workers' efforts; 
it persuaded the town and the state to kick in funds for the 
Torrington 
Thomaston 
Waterbury 
Seymour 
Ansonia 
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feasibility study. Personal contacts were made to win the 
cooperation of white-collar employees. 
A steering committee of blue- and white-collar workers was 
elected. It hashed out by-laws, vesting procedures, and other plans 
for the proposed new employee-owned company. It proposed to 
limit ownership to those who actually worked in the company and 
to elect the Board of Directors on a one-person-one-vote basis— 
an approach that was confirmed after a subcommittee travelled 
to Hyatt-Clark Industries in New Jersey and Atlas Chain in Eastern 
Pennsylvania, and learned about their difficulties with less 
democratic forms of employee ownership. 
The feasibility study indicated the company had strong production 
capabilities and a desirable market niche. A market plan, drawn 
up with the cooperation of local managers, indicated the company 
could be quite viable. 
Initially National Distillers declined to take the workers seriously 
as purchasers. It later indicated that the community support effort, 
which included letters from two bishops and many political 
figures, gave the employee plan credibility. Eventually the 
company donated $25,000 for the feasibility study and let its 
offices be used for its preparation. 
The employees decided to make a bid for the company, based 
on an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). After a last-minute 
bid was made and withdrawn by a competing company, National 
Distillers accepted the ESOP offer. A bank provided the financing. 
The union agreed to accept a 10% wage cut to ease servicing of 
the debt. In April 1985, Bridgeport Brass was reborn as "Seymour 
Specialty Wire: An Employee-Owned Company." 
Seymore Specialty Wire is run by a Board of Directors of nine. 
"The Naugatuck Valley Project is a 
coalition, it's cooperation, it's a way to bring 
some new players onto the scene. I hope the 
Project has given business a better name, 
just as I certainly gained a great deal more 
respect for organized labor and some of the 
constituent groups that are involved in the 
Project than I had before." 
—Vance Taylor, president of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Northwest 
Connecticut and co-chair of the 
Torrington Chapter of the Naugatuck 
Valley Project. 
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There are two outside directors selected by the Board, and the 
union and company presidents are automatically members. The 
other five are elected by all employees on a one-person-one-vote 
basis. Committees on personnel, operations, planning, education, 
and new business development assist the Board's decisions. A 
management search committee, after reviewing 170 resumes, 
decided to hire the former manager of the local plant as president 
of the new company. 
Economically, the first year of Seymour Specialty Wire has been 
a remarkable success. Sales have risen despite price increases. The 
handful of workers initially laid off have been rehired, and over 
a dozen new workers have been hired. A major new casting unit 
has been purchased to ensure the company an independent supply 
of brass. After six months workers received a bonus, and the 10% 
wage cut has been restored. 
Seymour remains a UAW firm. Only minor changes have been 
made in the union contract, such as a streamlining of job bidding 
procedures. There has been little change in production quotas, 
though by all accounts peer pressure has led to tightening up of 
work practices. Some common work rules designed to protect 
bargaining unit jobs, such as prohibitions on foremen working or 
workers voluntarily helping others with their jobs, are left 
unenforced. 
The transition to an employee-owned company has involved role 
changes which have been challenging for both workers and 
management. For the workers, employee-ownership implied a 
much more active role not only in the production process but also 
in the governance of the company. An attitude of "I'll go in and 
do my job and let someone else worry about the comapny" became 
less appropriate, especially when the consequences were company 
policies that workers didn't like. 
For management, traditional managerial authority was suddenly 
transformed into something like democratic government. Manage-
ment was initially concerned to protect its authority, but gradually 
came to believe that an employee-owned company must be run 
differently than a conventional company, with employees making 
decisions that management used to make. 
While the union and the blue-collar workforce apparently 
accepted the necessity of managers making day-to-day decisions, 
they expected major decisions to be made by a process of 
discussion and consent. They wanted managers to be accountable 
for their actions. And they wanted personnel policies and 
procedures to be consistent for blue- and white-collar employees. 
Seymour's first year has been marked by a process of redefinition 
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of roles that can be compared to that of a country which has 
suddenly been transformed from a monarchy to a constitutional 
republic, where rules and processes for decision-making must be 
re-invented almost from scratch. 
Initially, day-to-day practices in the workplace changed little— 
leading to an accumulation of conflicts and divergent expectations. 
Near the end of the first year, as tensions mounted, this situation 
was addressed by a goal-setting process created with the help of 
ICA. Employees Were divided at random into groups of 15 to 20, 
who met to express their concerns, identify goals for the company, 
and elect delegates to an ad hoc committee. This committee 
defined five goals for the company and developed a plan for 
meeting each of them. 
The most crucial is a plan, dubbed "Workers Solving Problems," 
under which all the workers on each shift in each department will 
meet every two weeks to discuss all issues concerning the 
department and the company. An elected convener will chair; the 
foreman will take minutes, which will be posted in the shop. A 
company-wide council of shop representatives and foremen will 
pool reports from the departments and pass information back to 
the shop floor. Top management is responsible to the Board for 
implementing the plan; ICA will provide training for participants. 
The most obvious lesson of Seymour Specialty Wire is that, 
under favorable circumstances, employee buyouts can be an 
effective solution to the threat of a plant sale or closing. But a 
buyout is only the starting point for a process of transformation 
that cannot be expected to proceed without false starts and 
conflicts. The structures and practices of the workplace, evolved 
over generations, aren't overcome simply by having workers elect 
the Board of Directors. Seymour's forthcoming attempt to develop 
new ways of running the company may be the most significant 
part of the entire effort. 
Other Buyout Efforts 
As the Seymour Specialty Wire buyout hit the headlines, workers 
at four other companies turned to the NVP for help. 
Faced with threats of closing or sale, employees at the AMF 
Alcort sailboat company in Waterbury formed a steering commit-
tee, conducted a feasibility study, and attempted to buy the 
company. After prolonged negotiations, the owners sold to another 
bidder, whose asserted intent to keep the company running locally 
has met with considerable skepticism. Workers at Judd Hardware 
Company, a plant outside the Valley, also turned to the Project 
to aid a buyout, only to : 
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"The first task of the banking committee 
was to trace the amount of money banks 
had from depositors in the Valley. We found 
out that one of the banks reinvested less than 
5% of its assets in the Valley. It awakened 
people's vision: what are the banks doing for 
us?" 
—Muriel Moore, director of the Head 
Start program in Waterbury and head of 
the Naugatuck Valley Project's banking 
committee. 
to aid a buyout, only to find their plant sold to another buyer. 
A few months after its meeting with the Project, Clevepak 
decided to get rid of its Torin Machinery Division and, as it had 
previously promised, informed the workers of its intent. Workers 
in the machine division formed a steering committee, conducted 
a feasibility study, and made an offer for the plant. Clevepak 
agreed to sell but, despite the mobilization of U.S. senators and 
representatives, state and federal agencies, and many other 
supporters, repeated efforts to put together a financing package 
ended in failure. Torrington's mayor even raised the possibility 
of using eminent domain to prevent the shutdown of the plant, 
based in part on research and support provided by the Project. 
Clevepak eventually liquidated the company. The NVP has 
assisted a businessman who has purchased some of its equipment 
and has hired 25 former Torin workers. Although the new 
company will start non-union, Torin union leaders who led the 
buyout effort are actively helping the new company in the hope 
of restoring jobs. 
The Fight for Century Brass 
The number of hourly employees at Century Brass, once Water-
bury's largest industrial employer, has gone from 1,721 in 1976 
to 438 in 1986. After a long series of union concessions and a 
classic milking of the company, Century filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court allowed the company to 
abrogate its union contract and renege on pension commitments. 
Looking for a handle on the situation, the UAW local at Century 
asked the Project to become involved, created a buyout committee, 
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and sponsored a feasibility study. Century Brass refused even to 
discuss selling to the workers; white-collar employees, perhaps 
fearing company reprisals, did not join the buyout effort. While 
Century workers received a good deal of local sympathy, the kind 
of supportive mobilization that developed in the smaller towns 
did not materialize in the larger city of Waterbury. 
In April 1986 the bankruptcy court allowed Century's hundreds 
of acres of valuable property running through the center of the 
city to be sold to the highest bidder, a real estate company from 
California. While the purchaser initially plans to lease the working 
plants back to Century, there is deep concern locally that this is 
only a step on the way to liquidation. 
The state has allocated $250,000 to study the future use of 
Century properties. The UAW buyout committee and the NVP 
have responded by demanding that the mayor and other officials 
hold up the study until commitments are made to save the 
remaining jobs at Century. This required massive research and 
a series of community meetings to convey to the public that 
Century is not just another company but rather an unconscionable 
exploiter of the Waterbury community. 
After a recent community meeting publicized Century's 
behavior, Century officials offered to talk with the minister who 
chaired the meeting and to other clergymen—but refused to talk 
with the NVP or the union. When the minister responded that 
the Project, not the company, would decide who would represent 
it in any meetings, Century Brass changed course and has now 
held two meetings with Project representatives and city officials. 
Century Brass has raised a new series of questions to the Project. 
It has demanded a search for alternatives where buyouts are not 
the answer. It has shown that the process of community mobili-
zation in a city of 100,000 is considerably different from that in 
a city of 10,000 or 20,000. And it has posed the problem of how 
to proceed when a company initially refuses to make even a token 
response to community demands. But whatever else, it has meant 
that Century workers are no longer simply passive pawns but have 
become an extremely active and vocal force in trying to shape their 
own future. 
Financing Buyouts 
The Torin experience led the Project to conclude that having 
sources of financing in place before buyouts begin can make a 
crucial difference in their success. Out of this awareness came 
the Project's first major legislative effort. 
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In 1984, the Connecticut legislature had established a trust fund 
to subsidize interest on bank loans to Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs). In 1985 the NVP drafted legislation to make money 
from the fund available for loans to employee groups seeking to 
buy their own companies. Several large community meetings were 
held; legislators from the Valley and the state party leaderships 
were lobbied. The bill passed both houses unanimously. 
The Project is now exploring two additional possibilities for 
financing future buyouts. One is a revolving fund which would 
put money from credit unions, churches, unions, and other 
institutions into a mix of employee-owned companies and other 
socially useful local investments such as housing. The other 
possibility is establishment of a banking consortium to invest in 
employee buyouts. This should help spread the risk among 
different banks and at the same time alleviate banks' concern 
about the public relations effects of having to foreclose on an 
employee-owned company. 
While the Project's banking committee hopes that local banks 
will voluntarily support such an effort, they point out that most 
are not controlled in the Valley, and that at present most do limited 
commercial lending there. At one Project meeting a local pastor 
won loud applause for the proposal that "we say we are willing 
to deposit our money only in banks willing to help this Valley." 
The Organization 
Each of its campaigns has brought together an NVP coalition 
in the community where it was conducted, plus a growing core 
of people and groups committed to the Project as a whole. The 
Project as a whole was run by a steering committee which started 
with representatives of the initiating statewide organizations and 
gradually brought in more and more people from organizations 
in the Valley itself. Staff worked hard to encourage a transfer of 
responsibility to participants from the Valley. In October 1985, 
250 delegates representing 50 churches, unions, community and 
business groups came to a convention in Waterbury to formalize 
the Project as a permanent, self-governing organization with its 
own by-laws and elected officers. 
The Naugatuck Valley Project is essentially a citizens' organiza-
tion in the general tradition pioneered by Saul Alinsky's Industrial 
Areas Foundation. The mixed character of the participating 
institutions is particularly important. Catholic and Protestant 
denominations, the UAW, and the Connecticut Citizen's Action 
Group have remained its most important constituents; but 
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"It was a shame what happened to this 
community. The big brass companies took 
everything out. Any business that's doing 
business in the city of Waterbury or the state 
of Connecticut should have to put something 
back into the city or state. The big brass just 
took and then left us high and dry. 
"I keep saying that we're making history 
right in the Valley. There was a manufac-
turing revolution back in the early days. 
Now were in.a buyout revolution." 
—Mike Colucci, an electric meter man at 
Connecticut Light & Power for 38 years, member of IBEW Local 420, 
head of a neighborhood organization called the Brooklyn Committee of 
New Opportunities for Waterbury, and a member of the legislative and 
banking committees of the Naugatuck Valley Project. 
Seymour Specialty Wire, The Chamber of Commerce of North-
western Connecticut, and a variety of other organizations have 
also joined. 
The broadest coalition was formed in the small factory town 
of Torrington. There, despite a long history of local industrial 
conflict, the Project chapter includes the Chamber of Commerce 
as well as local union and religious leaders. The Chamber's small-
business constituency is badly hurt by plant closings, and appears 
more than willing to accept employee buyouts if they preserve 
local jobs and payrolls. Local unions and the Chamber successfully 
lobbied together under Project auspices for protection of the 
region's machine tool industry. Each welcomes this opportunity 
to combine forces where they share overriding local interests; 
neither expects the other to support it on issues, such as 
unemployment compensation reform, where they disagree. 
(Perhaps there is a parallel here to the many nineteenth and early 
twentieth century occasions in which local small businessmen 
supported local strikes against what were perceived as the 
encroachments of "outside" corporations. A strike in 1903 against 
a Waterbury trolley company that had been taken over by an out-
of-town corporation, for example, won extensive sympathy from 
local businessmen.) 
The only divided votes at the Project's founding convention were 
on resolutions to support voter registration and to oppose utility 
rate increases. Both resolutions, presented by the Connecticut 
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Citizen's Action Group, passed with slight rewording. What 
tensions would arise within the Project coalition if it resorted to 
more militant tactics—for example, picketing unresponsive 
companies or their officers, boycotting banks, or attempting to buy 
companies through eminent domain—remain to be seen. 
While its efforts at worker buyouts have received the most 
attention, the Naugatuck Valley Project is really focused more 
broadly on the issue of preserving and creating good jobs, especially 
industrial jobs. It is essentially a means by which workers and 
communities can influence economic decisions that affect the 
Valley. Its focus on jobs makes its goals central to the lives of many 
people in the Valley, and much of its energy has come from 
workers and communities directly threatened by plant closings. 
At the same time it has been able to show cumulative growth, 
perhaps because it is not limited to a single focus, such as saving 
one local plant. Those active in efforts around one plant often 
comment that they would remain active in the NVP even if their 
particular issue were resolved. 
There appears to be a consensus among those active in the 
Project that its central focus should continue to be jobs. How this 
should be interpreted, and what other issues should be dealt with 
as well, remains to be clarified. The Project has already been 
involved in a successful effort to save a local branch of the state 
university; it is currently exploring the possibility of helping start 
a supermarket and organize a land trust. Visions of the future 
range from an organization focused on employee buyouts to one 
which will represent the full range of people's needs in the Valley. 
What seems to be agreed is that new spheres of action should 
emerge organically out of previous ones and out of needs perceived 
strongly by the Project's constituency in the Valley. 
One future task that Project staff identify as crucial is deepening 
the relationship between the Project and its member groups. They 
have started providing leadership training programs to help 
member groups draw their own members more deeply into their 
own and Project activities. They also see a need for the Project 
to move toward financial independence, perhaps in part by 
providing services to member groups and employee-owned 
enterprises. 
The Project makes no effort to define itself in ideological terms. 
When pressed, some of its leaders portray worker buyouts as a 
form of capitalism; others see it as a democratization of the 
workplace. For most, it seems primarily a means for meeting the 
needs of local communities and workers, rather than an expression 
of a political or economic philosophy. If any single sentiment ties 
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Shutdown mills at Century Brass in Waterbury. . . 
Project activists together, it is a strong sense of community 
responsibility, coupled with a belief that Naugatuck Valley 
communities will be vulnerable to disruption as long as they do 
not in some way control their economic future. 
While Project leaders seem reluctant to state a vision beyond 
encouraging broad-based ownership of the Valley's economy, 
Bishop Rosazza does say, "It would be great to make of the Valley 
a little Mondragon." (Mondragon is a region in the Basque country 
of Spain with a series of worker-owned enterprises tied together 
with their own credit institutions, social security plans and 
educational programs.) 
In addition to its concrete successes, there can be little question 
that the Naugatuck Valley Project has transformed the issue of 
jobs and plant closings not only in the Valley but throughout the 
state of Connecticut. Where two years ago closings were almost 
universally blamed on high wages and uncooperative unions, there 
is now a widespread awareness of the milking of the area's 
economy by outside corporations. Where corporate decisions were 
regarded as something the public simply had to accept, it is now 
acknowledged as legitimate for groups like NVP to challenge 
business decisions and their human impact. And where the idea 
of workers buying and running their own companies was regarded 
as the height of absurdity, there is today a tremendous interest 
in the idea among politicians, community leaders, and especially 
among workers who feel threatened by plant closings. 
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. . . Seymour Specialty Wire, An Employee-Owned Company. 
Some Lessons 
Project leaders and staff point out a number of lessons their 
experience might hold for those concerned with jobs and plant 
closings elsewhere. 
• A project of this kind needs a clear focus, such as jobs and plant 
closings, but it also needs a multi-focus framework that allows 
small victories and cumulative drawing in of additional people. 
• Much of the energy and legitimacy for the Project comes from 
the involvement of those most directly affected. NVP efforts 
have almost always started with discussions with the leader-
ship of the local union as the representatives of the largest group 
of employees, then gone directly to the membership of the local, 
and then reached out to white-collar workers and the wider 
community. 
• It takes a certain creativity to bargain with companies over local 
jobs. Buyouts cannot always be the primary goal or focus 
because in most cases they are not feasible or appropriate and 
because defining a buyout as the only alternative puts all the 
bargaining chips in the hands of the company. It is crucial to 
develop bargaining goals that are appropriate to the situation 
and that allow partial victories: an agreement to give notice of 
any plans to sell, to give preference to a purchaser who will 
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keep jobs in the community, to give workers the right of first 
refusal if a company is sold, and the like. 
A "carrot-and-stick" relationship is necessary toward the 
companies with which you are bargaining. It is often necessary 
to publicize a company's acts and even attempt to embarrass it. 
Says Rev. Benson: 
"A lot of people like to keep everything quiet and peaceful, 
but my experience is that the quieter you keep it, the more 
likelihood there is of the whole deal being pulled out from under 
you. The more you're in the public eye, the more you're likely 
to get cooperation." 
But a successful outcome may also require working with a 
company constructively and projecting an approach with which 
it can cooperate. At Seymour, for instance, the company at first 
had to be pressured into taking the employee buyout effort 
seriously; but thereafter it provided cooperation that was 
extremely helpful in making the buyout a success. 
Much more sophistication about the business world is needed 
than a community organization usually possesses. This means 
a necessity for the services of lawyers, accountants, and 
business consultants, and for ways that ordinary participants 
"Before, under National Distillers, it was 
like puppets or like a number in a 
computer. The only way we had any kind 
of control over National, where we could 
fight back, was the grievance procedure. 
"Now you don't have big daddy looking 
over your shoulder. You don't have to worry 
about National coming in and saying, 
"we're going to eliminate this; Carl, cut this 
out," and there goes 20 jobs. 
"We're having a few problems now, but 
that's the way it should be. Anything that's 
happened in the company since we bought it, I've been called upstairs, asked 
my opinion. Once all the employees are involved in one step or another of 
that decision-making process, controlling their future—that should be the 
ultimate. Besides making money." 
—Mike Kearney, president of UAW Local 1827 at Seymour Specialty 
Wire and vice president of the Naugatuck Valley Project. 
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can learn to understand and research business issues. 
• Some of the Project's strength has come from its independence. 
While many Project leaders are active in politics, all seem agreed 
that the Project itself should be independent of political parties 
—functioning in the political arena as a nonpartisan citizens' 
organization. In a recent contest for the Democratic nomina-
tion for governor, one Project leader ran as a delegate on the 
slate of Governor William O'Neil while another apparently 
swung his town to O'Neil's opponent, Toby Moffett, with a 
charge that O'Neil had provided inadequate support for the 
Torin buyout effort. Says Rev. Benson: 
"In the by-laws, we tried to delineate that we need to keep 
a distance from the political process. We can't be in any political 
party's pocket, or any politician's pocket, because as soon as 
we are, we lose our effectiveness as an organization." 
Conclusion 
In many ways the Naugatuck Valley would seem an unpromising 
place for an effort of this kind. It is neither an unusually homo-
geneous area nor one with a strong progressive tradition. Before 
the Project, there were hardly even modest responses to the threat 
of deindustrialization. While the region has some geographical 
unity and shared historical identity, there were few organizational 
or governmental structures tying together the Valley as a whole. 
(In some ways this may have been an advantage, since before the 
Project, the Valley as a whole was not defined as anybody's "turf.") 
Organizer Ken Galdston regards the existence of local and state 
organizations with a strong concern for the jobs issue and a prior 
history of cooperation as the biggest asset the region brought to 
the initiation of such an effort. And Rev. Benson points out that 
Naugatuck Valley towns are proud of their "milltown" identity 
and are therefore more willing than some communities to fight 
to keep their local factories. 
Because the Naugatuck Valley is so typical of deindustrializing 
American communities, it is hard to see why efforts similar to the 
Naugatuck Valley Project might not be equally successful else-
where. Of course, there are many aspects of the American and 
world economies that cannot be addressed from a purely local 
basis. But a proliferation of such experiments might not only help 
local communities solve immediate problems, but might also help 
transform the context in which national economic issues are 
debated. • 
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